Abstract. Today, digital content is routinely distributed over the Internet, and consumed in devices based on open platforms. This calls for mechanisms that can enable flexible ways of using the content while ensuring that the security objectives of all parties are satisfied in a fair manner. Stateful licenses play an important role in this context since they keep state on usage of rights on digital content (e.g., usage for n days), and can enable lending and moving usage rights from one device to another.
This and other similar scenarios for trading and using digital goods involve policies whose enforcement requires the enforcement mechanism to securely maintain state information about past usage or environmental factors. They can be enforced by using stateful licenses. Some e-business applications already deploy such (mostly proprietary) stateful licences to sell certain digital goods (online video, music tracks, software), for limited use (number of copies or trials, etc.) [3, 10, 28, 43] .
However, managing and enforcing stateful licenses on open platforms is difficult. Open platforms are under the control of their owners, who can attack and circumvent even sophisticated protection mechanisms by running exploits and reconfiguring the underlying operating system. Existing enforcement mechanisms have been defeated in various ways [34, 46, 47] . An attacker can easily record the platform state (e.g., harddisks) and revert the platform to this state at a future point in time. This way he can reset a stateful license to a prior state and consequently circumvent license conditions. This can be done for instance by ordinary backup mechanisms or by applying software tools [13] that log all storage modifications to easily revoke these modifications for reuse of a license. 1 Consequently, content providers tend to provide inflexible static licenses, which prevent users from any kind of transfer of licenses, including moving to other devices, lending or selling to other users. This approach is not tenable in the long term because its restrictiveness prevents reasonable usage scenarios like the above from being realized. Even honest users, frustrated at not being able to do what they consider reasonable, will be tempted to circumvent the license enforcement mechanisms.
Some systems attempt to augment open platforms with tamper-resistant hardware devices such as dongles 2 [9] or smartcards [5] . Others have used closed systems [18] that consider only the providers needs 3 . The use of additional, external devices, however, cannot guarantee the integrity of the operating system and a proper behavior of applications since manipulations of the operating system or corresponding applications frequently allow users to bypass the security mechanisms.
Main Contribution: In this paper we present a security architecture and the corresponding reference implementation that enables secure enforcement of stateful licenses on open computing platforms as well as secure license transfers among platforms. Our proposed architecture allows for protecting the security objectives of providers (license enforcement) and users (flexibility, fairer usage, and privacy). Our main goal is to show the feasibility of the legal and fair usage allowing for transfer of licenses. To the best of our knowledge there currently exists no solution that is capable of enforcing stateful licenses on open platforms while providing security functionalities that allow to establish multilateral security. We show how our architecture can efficiently be implemented using existing virtualization and trusted computing technology.
Related Work
Shapiro and Vingralek [41, 53] identified the replay problem in client platforms that are completely under the control of the user. The authors proposed to manage persistent states using external locker services or assumed a small amount of secure memory and secure one-way counters realized by battery-backed SRAM or special on-chip EEPROM/ROM functions. Tygar and Yee [52] elaborate on applications of physically secure coprocessors, including enforcement of static and dynamic licenses without centralized servers. They show how to protect and attest the integrity of their system with the help of a secure coprocessor and a secure bootstrap process. In addition, protocols for sealing of data to a local platform and binding of data to a remote platform are presented. They identify the replay problem in the context of electronic currency and propose a "two-phase" commit to ensure atomic transfers to remote platforms. The proposed architecture relies on a microkernel which is running in a physical security partition provided by the secure coprocessor. This is different to our approach which is based on a virtualization layer offering logical security partitions ("compartments"). Marchesini et al. [24] use OS hardening to create "software compartments" which are isolated from each other and cannot be accessed by a "root spy". Based thereon, their design provides "compartmentalized attestation", i.e. attestation and binding of data to single compartments. Our approach does not employ OS hardening techniques to secure a complex monolithic legacy OS. Instead we put the legacy OS in a compartment which is then run on top of a virtualization layer. The performance loss is minor and the overall security improves, since the virtualization layer is much less complex than a monolithic OS kernel. Baek and Smith [7] build on Marchesini's work and implement a prototype for enforcing QoS policies on open platforms.
Publicly available documentation on both DRM implementations of Microsoft Windows Rights Management Services [27] and Authentica Active Rights Management [6] do not mention how they resist replay attacks. In this context, a replay attack constitutes a backup of the persistent storage of a client application taken at a time when the client application can access a document. Restoring the backup at a later time gives the client renewed access to the document in the absence of re-play protection. The same holds for common DRM implementations for digital content (audio, video, ebooks, software), e.g., Microsoft's Windows Media Rights Management [26] , Apple's FairPlay [3] and Real Network's Helix DRM [32] , all providing proprietary stateful licenses. Moreover, most of these solutions are closed software and cannot be verified for inherent security flaws. Some existing solutions affect the entire host security or violate user privacy [34] , while others could be broken [47, 46] , and provide license transfers only to some selected devices owned by the user. This point clearly contradicts the first sale concept: the licensor should be allowed to securely transfer legally obtained digital content without permission or interaction of the licensee. Another approach uses small-value or short-term sub-licenses based on a single source license to transfer rights. Examples are transient licenses [31] , rechargeable tokens [19] , or tracking files [22] . Since users of these systems always have full control over the platform storage, they can easily backup their (sub-)licenses and restore them after expiration. In [38, 40] , the authors propose an operating system extension that attests an integrity measurement (a SHA-1 digest over all executed content) based on a cryptographic coprocessor. The proposed architecture allows a content provider to remotely verify the integrity of software and data of a client platform. However, this approach, reveals the user's overall platform configuration to the content provider, conflicting with the privacy principle of least information [15] . Also, the content provider will only attest the last platform configuration given and is not able to predict future configuration. And even if periodic attestation was compelled, a client could still apply replay attacks between two measurements.
The Enforcer project alias The Bear [23, 25] considers freshness by using the (non-volatile) data integrity register (DIR) of the TCG (Trusted Computing Group) specification version 1.1b [50] . Writing to a DIR requires owner authorization, reading can be done by anyone. Since the platform owner can still backup and restore the DIR storage, this is not secure against replay attacks.
New processor architectures like AEGIS [44] and XOM [20] provide secure in-processor storage that cannot be reset by unauthorized entities. Although it seems possible to use these processor architectures as a basis for protecting the freshness of information, we chose another solution which builds on (cheaper) commercial-off-the-shelf components.
System Model

Terms and Definitions
The main parties involved are providers (licensors) and users (licensees). We consider a provider as the representative party for rights-holders whereas the user represents consumers of digital content. These parties have only limited trust in each other. As shown in Figure 1 , the provider distributes digital content (e.g., software, media files) together with the corresponding license, which defines the usage-rights (e.g., copy, play, print) applicable to the content 4 . The user consumes the content according to the license where the consumption is managed by the underlying platform. We distinguish two types of licenses, static licenses and stateful licenses. For the latter type, the internal license state may change when the license is used. This allows for many use cases where content consumption is somehow limited (e.g., n days or n times), or for transfer of licenses among devices.
Furthermore, we define a compartment as a software component that is logically isolated from other software components. Isolation means that these components can communicate or access each others data only over specified interfaces. The configuration of a compartment unambiguously describes the compartment's I/O behavior. We call the process of deriving the configuration of a compartment measurement according to a well-defined metric. We distinguish secure and trusted communication channels between compartments. Secure channels ensure confidentiality and integrity of the communicated data as well as the authenticity 5 of the endpoint compartment. A Trusted channel is a secure channel that is bound to the configuration of the endpoint. More concretely, the channel additionally allows each endpoint compartment to (i) validate the configuration of the other endpoint compartment and (ii) to bind data to the configuration of the endpoint compartment such that solely and exclusively this compartment with this configuration can access the data. We define the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) as the set of all system components whose failure would allow to breach the security policy defined for the platform (e.g., as agreed by the involved parties). Note that the main design goal is to minimize the TCB. Figure 1 gives a general overview of our architecture. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for our purpose (application) includes the following compartments: the User Manager (UM), the Trust Manager (TM), the Storage Manager (SM), the Compartment Manager (CM), the Secure I/O (SO) compartment, and the DRM Controller (DC). Note that these components are in general distributed since all compartments communicate over trusted channels, and hence, there is no restriction on their actual physical location. In the following we briefly describe the compartments and core security properties of our architecture. User Manager (UM) performs user authentication and manages the secrets attached to each user, e.g., to allow the Storage Manager SM to bind data to a certain user. Since the interface offered by UM hides the concrete user model, it is possible to use a UNIX-like, or a role-based user model without modifications of other system components.
Architecture Overview
Compartment Manager (CM) initializes and closes compartments as well as measures compartments' configurations during initialization. Furthermore, CM enables a mapping between temporary compartment identifiers 6 and persistent compartment configurations.
Trust Manager (TM) offers basic Trusted Computing services and a functionality that can be used by other compartments to, e.g., establish trusted channels between compartments.
Storage Manager (SM) provides persistent storage 7 for other compartments while preserving integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (by binding data to the compartment configuration and/or user secrets), availability 8 and freshness of the stored data. Since a completely tamper-resistant storage unit would clearly be very costly and inflexible, we used untrusted storage (e.g., a regular harddisk) with the help of TM.
Secure I/O (SO) renders (e.g., displays, plays, prints) content while preventing content leakage into untrusted compartments. Thus SO incorporates all functionality required for rendering a certain content, e.g., all corresponding drivers, rendering engines, and decoders. Moreover, access control in our architecture allows SO to communicate only with devices essential for the rendering process.
DRM Controller (DC) is a compartment that enforces the policy according to a given license attached to digital content. DC enforces security policies locally, e.g., it uses trusted channels to decide whether a certain SO is trusted for rendering the content.
9 DC interprets the license and initiates content rendering. Moreover, DC is the core component for license transfers (cf. Section 2.3). Available content and licenses are internally indexed by DC and the index, content and licenses are persistently stored using the Storage Manager SM.
Trusted Channels as mentioned in Section 2.1, allow the involved communication end-points (compartments) to validate the configuration of the other endpoint for integrity and consequently allow determining the trustworthiness (as specified by the underlying security policy). The data sent over a trusted channel is exclusively bound to the configuration of the endpoint compartment as measured by the CM. In contrast to other approaches such as [38, 40] , which report the whole platform configuration, our architecture provides trusted channels between single compartments reducing the amount of information disclosed about the platform (privacy aspects).
10 Trusted channels can be established using the functionality offered by the Trust Manager TM. We distinguish local trusted channels between compartments running on the same platform and online/offline trusted channels between a local and a remote compartment with/without having a direct connection. We will elaborate on trusted channels with a remote compartment in Section 3.3.
Strong Isolation means runtime isolation of compartments as well as data isolation in persistent storage. Runtime isolation is provided by the underlying virtualization layer (cf. Section 3.1), and the isolation of compartments' persistent state is provided by the Storage Manager (SM).
Usage and Transfer of Licenses
In the following, we define the basic mechanisms for secure license usage and license transfers. For this we assume the following to be given, and explain in Section 3 how they are implemented: (i) strong compartment isolation (cf. Section 3.1), (ii) the proper initialization of the TCB (cf. Section 3.2), and (iii) the availability of trusted channels with freshness detection (cf. Section 3.3).
On startup, DC loads its actual content/license index i DC from the Storage Manager SM using a local trusted channel. To provision licenses the provider establishes a trusted channel to DC. Over this channel the content and licenses are sent to DC and locally stored by SM. For using (stateful) licenses the user invokes DC, which loads the corresponding license, checks if all conditions for the corresponding usage-rights are fulfilled, and opens a local trusted channel to the secure I/O compartment SO. On the execution of the usage-right, DC updates the state of the license, synchronizes its internal state i DC with the one stored by SM, decrypts the corresponding content, and invokes SO to securely render it. For transferring stateful licenses from a source controller DC s to a destination controller DC d the following steps are be taken: 7 Since SM does not provide sharing of data between compartments, it does not realize a regular file system. 8 Note that for availability of data, solutions based on high redundancy such as using multiple storage locations (e.g., USB sticks or online sites) assisted by an appropriate RAID system can be used. In case of failure of a particular storage device, it is still possible to retrieve data from alternative storage mirrors. 9 DC's decision is based on either a approved configuration concretely described in the license or on the platform security policy associated with the actual TCB configuration. 10 Further advantages of our approach are scalability and flexibility: it need not to verify the integrity (trustworthiness) of all compartments executed on the platform and the integrity verification remains valid even if the user installs or modifies other compartments since this verification is independent of other compartments running in parallel. The procedure for lending a license is similar to a license transfer: if the license allows lending DC s generates a license for DC d valid for the loan period, and updates the state of its own license so that it remains disabled during the loan period. This assumes the availability of secure time.
Security Objectives
We consider the following security objectives of users and providers.
(O1) License integrity: Unauthorized alteration of licenses must be infeasible. This is required by both provider and user. (O2) License enforcement : The license can only be used according to the usage-rights prescribed by the license and to the security policy defining requirements on DC. (O3) Freshness: Replay of licenses must be infeasible. Received and retrieved data is the last one sent or stored even in the case of a full platform re-installation. (O4) License availability: Legally obtained licenses can be used at any time under the terms specified. This especially requires caution with regard to physical and/or logical failures as well as software modification and updates. (O5) Privacy: Usage or transfer of licenses must not violate privacy policies. This concerns in particular the least information policy [15] such that components not under full control of the user shall be able to collect, store, and reveal user's private information only to the extent required for license enforcement.
The system is not limited to a specific set of license issuers, and is capable of enforcing the terms of any license accepted by the user. Requirements like license issuance and unforgeability is considered out of the scope of this paper. Distributed authorship proofs and rights management (e.g., as in [1] ) can still effectively be built based on our architecture.
Reference Implementation
Overview
Our implementation primarily relies on a small security kernel, virtualization technology, and Trusted Computing technology. The security kernel, located as a control instance between the hardware and the application layer, implements elementary security properties like trusted channels and strong isolation between processes. Virtualization technology enables reutilization of legacy operating systems and existing applications whereas Trusted Computing technology serves as root of trust.
In our architecture a compartment maps to a running application or operating system, whereas a compartment configuration maps to a hash value of the software binary including all initialization information. The architecture of our reference implementation is depicted in Figure 2 whose layers we describe below. Hardware Layer. The hardware layer consists of commercial off-the-shelf PC hardware enhanced with Trusted Computing technology as defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [49] . TCG has published several specification for extending the common computing platforms with cryptographic and security features in hardware and software. The main TCG specification is Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [50, 51] , which is currently implemented as dedicated cost-effective crypto chip mounted on mainboards of computing devices 12 . Many vendors already ship their platforms with TPMs (mainly laptop PCs and servers) providing the following features: A hardware-based random number generator (RNG), a cryptographic engine for encryption and signing (RSA) as well as a cryptographic hash function (SHA-1, HMAC), read-only memory (ROM) for firmware and certificates, volatile memory (RAM), non-volatile memory (EEPROM) for internal keys, monotonic counter values and authorization secrets, and optionally, sensors for tampering detection. Security critical operations (e.g., key generation and decryption) are performed on-chip and security critical information (e.g., secret keys) never leave the TPM unencrypted. The TPM's most important keys were the endorsement key EK , an asymmetric key that uniquely identifies each TPM; and the Storage Root Key SRK , an asymmetric key used to encrypt all other keys created by the TPM. Note that neither EK nor SRK can be readout from the TPM. The TPM provides further a set of registers called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) that can be used to store hash values. 13 During system startup, a chain of trust is established by cryptographically hashing each boot stage before execution. These hash values are also called measurements (in the TCG terminology) and are stored in PCRs. The set of PCR values provides is an evidence for the system's state after boot. This state is called the platform configuration. Based on this PCR set, among others, the two functions sealing resp. binding can be provided to relate data to a platform configuration, sealing additionally relating the data to the specific TPM instance using the TPM's endorsement key EK . Our implementation uses TPM version 1.2 [51] since older versions cannot be used to provide fresh storage as we will elaborate on in Appendix A.
Virtualization Layer. The main task of the virtualization layer is to provide an abstraction of the underlying hardware, e.g., CPU, interrupts, devices, and to offer an appropriate management interface. Moreover, this layer enforces an access control policy based on these resources. The current implementation is based on microkernels 14 of the L4-family [17, 21] . It implements hardware abstractions such as threads and logical address spaces as well as an inter-process communication (IPC). Device drivers and other essential operating system services, such as process management and memory management, run in isolated user-mode processes. 12 TPMs are assumed tamper-evident and will only provide a limited protection against hardware based attacks, due to the trade-off between costs and tamper protection. Nevertheless, at least rudimentary tamper precautions and tampering-detection sensors are included in the design and manufacturing process. 13 The hardware ensures that the value of a PCR can only be extended as follows: PCRi+1 ← hash [PCRi|x] , with the previous register value PCRi, the new register value PCRi+1, and the input value x (e.g., again a hash value). 14 A microkernel is an OS kernel that minimizes the amount of code running in privileged processor mode [33] .
In our implementation, we kept the interfaces between layers generic to support also other virtualization technologies (e.g., Xen [12, 39] ). However, we decided to employ a L4-microkernel that allows for isolation between processes without the need to create a full OS instance in every compartment in contrast to Xen.
Trusted Software Layer. The trusted software layer, based on the PERSEUS security architecture [30, 35, 37] , uses the functionality offered by the virtualization layer to provide security functionalities on a more abstract level. It provides elementary security properties such as trusted channels, platform policy control and compartment isolation. These realize security critical services independent of and protected from application layer compartments. The main services of the trusted software are described in Section 2.2.
Application Layer. On top of the security kernel, several instances of legacy operating systems (here Linux) as well as security-critical applications (here the DRM controller and Secure I/O) are executed in strongly isolated compartments. Unauthorized communication between compartments and unauthorized I/O access is prevented. The proposed architecture offers an efficient migration of existing legacy operating systems. We are currently running a para-virtualized Linux [16] . The legacy operating system provides all operating system services that are not security-critical and offers users a common environment and a large set of existing applications. If a mandatory security policy requires isolation between applications of the legacy OS, they can be executed by parallel instances of the legacy operating system.
In our reference implementation 15 , DC manages, based on XrML, license interpreting and license transfers for several audio formats. Using a Linux multimedia library [14] , our SO implementation provides the corresponding audio rendering and play-back.
Verifiable Initialization
For verifiable bootstrapping of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), a TCG-enabled BIOS, called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), measures the the Master Boot Record (MBR), before passing control to it. A secure chain of measurements is then established: Before a program code is executed it is measured by a previously (measured and executed) component. For this purpose, we have modified the GRUB bootloader (cf. www.prosec.rub.de/tgrub.html) to measure the integrity of the TCB. The measurement results are securely stored in the PCRs of the TPM. All further compartments, applications and legacy OS instances are then subsequently loaded, measured, and executed by the Compartment Manager CM.
Trust Manager and Trusted Channels
Our Trust Manager (TM) implementation is based on the open-source TCG software stack TrouSerS [48] . Trusted channels can be established online or offline. The former requires a direct connection between user and provider whereas the latter does not. Examples are the online purchase of content and licenses at a provider website or obtaining content offline via DVD or as indirect copy by a third party. Figure 3 gives a description of the protocol for establishing a trusted channel. The protocol can be decomposed into two major phases, namely issuing and verifying a target certificate, and establishing a secret key whose usage is bound to the configuration of the endpoint compartment and the underlying TCB.
If a remote compartment RC requests a trusted channel to a local compartment LC, LC passes this request to TM. TM maps LC's compartment identifier to its compartment configuration comp conf LC using CM. TM then uses, by the means of TPM CreateWrapKey[], the TPM to create a binding key pair (PK BIND , SK BIND ) where usage of SK BIND is restricted to the current TCB configuration TCB conf measured during initialization (cf. Section 3.2). The TPM then returns PK BIND and the encrypted secret part ESK BIND := encrypt SRK [SK BIND , TCB conf ] where SRK is TPM's Storage Root Key. Then TM invokes the TPM to sign PK BIND (and thus the corresponding TCB conf ) and comp conf LC using an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) 16 . We denote the result by cert BIND := TPM CertifyKey[PK BIND , comp conf LC ]. Finally, TM returns cert BIND together with PK BIND and ESK BIND to LC. LC then stores ESK BIND using SM and sends 15 The corresponding source code is available at www.emscb.org/download/ 16 An AIK is a special, non-migratable, anonymized key that has been attested to come from a TCG conform platform. (cert BIND , PK BIND ) to RC. RC verifies cert BIND and then the configurations (TCB conf , comp conf LC ) by comparing them with reference values (conforming to its security policy). If positive, RC generates a secret key sk and encrypts it using PK BIND . The result is denoted by esk := Tspi Data Bind[PK BIND , sk ] 17 and sent back to LC. Upon receipt of esk , LC loads ESK BIND from SM and requests TM to unbind sk . For this, TM again requests CM for mapping LC's compartment identifier to comp conf LC . Having successfully verified that comp conf LC matches the configuration denoted in cert BIND , TM requests the TPM to unbind sk . The TPM first compares the actual PCR values to those SK BIND was restricted to, before returning sk to TM. Finally, TM passes sk to LC that can now decrypt the data d (license and content) received from RC.
For online trusted channels, sk is used as session key to establish a secure channel inside a subsequent server-authenticated TLS connection between RC and LC 18 whereas for offline trusted channels sk is used for encryption of data before being transferred using a indirect connection between RC and LC.
Freshness extension. To tackle replay attacks we extend our trusted channels with freshness. In case of an online trusted channel, freshness can be mutually provided by the underlying TLS handshake protocol by binding the TLS channel to LC (channel binding). This can be done in various ways, e.g., by including cert BIND in regular TLS certificates.
In case of offline trusted channels (or without TLS) this can be provided by a slight protocol extension and/or measures at LC. Here different approaches are possible. A simple approach is to require LC to memorize all licenses it has received (i.e., even expired ones) to easily detect license replays. Eventually, this may amount 17 Tspi Data Bind[] is a TCG software stack function that does not require any TPM hardware (functionality). 18 Alternatively, PK BIND directly can be integrated into the TLS handshake, e.g., to encrypt RC's pre-master-secret.
to a huge license list, and one solution is to update (PK BIND , SK BIND ) from time to time. Another solution is to let LC also send a nonce N together with (cert BIND , PK BIND ). In the last protocol step, RC encrypts N together with corresponding data d , so that LC can verify N (and thus freshness) of d and delete N after decryption. An alternative solution to nonces is to let LC create a different public key pair (PK L , SK L ) for each license, store SK L in SM, and send (PK L , cert BIND , PK BIND ) to RC. Then RC encrypts data d as before using sk , but encrypts sk with PK L and PK BIND , i.e., esk := Tspi Data Bind[PK BIND , encrypt PK L [sk ]], and sends both quantities to LC. LC now can detect replays of already known licenses by identifying PK L . Recall that there is a unique relation between PK L and a license. Once a license has been expired or transferred, SK L can be deleted. In all scenarios, all secret keys and freshness verification information is persistently stored in trusted storage managed by SM (cf. Section 3.4). All solutions can defeat replays even if the platform is completely re-installed since in this case also all keys and freshness information (contained in SM) are deleted making the the corresponding licenses and content inaccessible.
TPM/TSS command Atmel 1.1b NSC 1.1b Certificate generation 30 -80 sec 52 -55 sec Binding of sk (without the TPM involved) < 1 sec < 1 sec Unbinding of sk 2 -3 sec 23 -24 sec Table 1 . Trust Manager performance using 2048-bit RSA keys.
We have implemented this protocol on TPMs of some major vendors (cf. Table 1 ). The TPM computation dominates the overall computation time. Hence, depending on the efficiency requirements of the underlying application, we have forseen a service (e.g., as part of the TM) that performs the related TPM tasks in software (e.g., generating binding keys). This service is clearly a part of the TCB and is included in the measurements during the verifiable initialization. In this case the trust assumptions of the TCB become stronger since the secret binding key is now in software and not in the TPM security module.
Storage Manager
The main interfaces of Storage Manager SM (cf. Figure 4) are the trusted channels load[] and store[] for loading/storing data for requesting compartments, and plain channels read[] and write[] for reading/writing data from/to an untrusted storage compartment (e.g., a hard disk drive) to persistently write respectively read data. Internally, SM maintains an index i SM for metadata of all managed data objects. The main entries in this index are: the configuration comp conf of the requesting compartment, the data object identifier d ID , its freshness detection information f , possible further access restrictions rest (e.g., user id, group id or date of expiry), a monotonic counter c SM verifying the freshness of i SM , and a sealed k SM used to seal i SM to SM's configuration.
To ensure freshness of the metadata the index i SM itself, SM manages an internal software counter c SM that is incremented synchronously with a TPM 1.2 19 monotonic hardware counter c TPM each time SM updates its index 20 . There are two methods of obtaining an external count, signed or unsigned. The external counter must allow for 7 years of increments every 5 seconds without causing a hardware failure. The output of the counter is a 32-bit value.
A mismatch means outdated data which will be handled according to the underlying security policy. In order to employ TPM's monotonic counters, SM has to be initialized correctly. Figure 5 depicts the steps needed for the first initialization of SM on a new platform together with the initialization necessary for instance after rebooting the platform. At initial setup SM uses the TPM to create its internal cryptographic key k SM , which is sealed to the current TCB configuration. To enable freshness detection and thus trusted storage, SM creates a monotonic counter c TPM with a label c label for identification and an authentication c auth (e.g., a randomly chosen secret password). The initial setup finishes with the generation of i SM and the sealed key ek SM and writing i SM (that includes c SM , c label and c auth) encrypted on untrusted storage using k SM .
After a platform reboot, SM reads the ek SM from the untrusted storage and asks the TPM to unseal ek SM to its internal key k SM . The TPM is able to unseal k SM if the platform has the same configuration as it had at the sealing process, thus preventing a modified SM to access k SM . Then SM uses k SM to decrypt i SM . Finally, SM verifies freshness of i SM by comparing the decrypted counter value c SM of i SM with the actual counter value of the corresponding hardware counter c TPM . Figure 6 depicts the protocol steps required to bind a compartment's data object (e.g., i DC ) persistently to its actual configuration. After the mapping of compartment identifier to the actual compartment configuration (e.g., comp conf DC ) using CM, SM updates i SM with the corresponding metadata as well as the incremented software counter c SM to enable freshness detection for i SM . SM encrypts both the data object and the updated index i SM using k SM and writes them to untrusted storage. Finally, SM synchronizes its software counter c SM with the TPM's monotonic hardware counter c TPM (using c label and c auth) and returns the data object identifier. Figure 7 depicts the protocol steps required to load a compartment's data object. Again after a mapping of compartment identifier to the actual compartment configuration using CM, SM reads the requested data object from untrusted storage and decrypts it using k SM . Before returning d to the corresponding compartment, SM verifies all existing access restrictions (e.g., freshness, or a certain user id) given on store via rest based on the corresponding metadata in i SM and verifies that the requesting compartment has the same configuration as used on store.
Security Considerations
In this section we sketch the security aspects of our implementation. First we consider the core security properties provided by our implementation. These are strong isolation, trusted channels, trusted storage and verifiable initialization. Based on these properties we consider the individual security objectives (cf. Section 2.4). Verifiable Initialization. It ensures that the TCB bootstrap is measured and securely stored in the TPM (cf. Section 3.2). Other compartments can then use TPM functionality to securely query the actual TCB configuration. Note that subsequent modifications at runtime are not reflected by the initialization measurements. However, a TCB configuration that would allow arbitrary alternation/patches of core security components cannot be considered as trustworthy.
Strong Isolation. Runtime isolation is provided by the small virtualization layer that implements only logical address spaces, inter-process communication (IPC) and an appropriate interface to enforce an access control management for the underlying hardware. Device drivers and other essential operating system services, such as process management and memory management, run in isolated user-mode processes. Thus, the amount of code running in privileged ("ring 0") processor mode, is small 21 and can, in contrast to monolithic operating system kernels 22 such as Linux or MS Windows, be easier validated for correctness. Moreover, a failure in one of these services cannot directly affect the other services, especially the code running in privileged mode. Thus, malicious device drivers cannot compromise core operating system services as they are all executed in user-mode. Isolation in persistent storage is provided by our Storage Manager (SM) implementation and the usage of trusted channels.
Trusted Channels. The establishment of a trusted channel is described detailed in Section 3.3. The interprocess communication (IPC) provided by the virtualization layer enables secure channels between local compartments. Secure channels between local and remote compartments can be provided either by using the secret key sk to establish a secret channel inside a tunnel created by standard security protocols such as TLS [11] (online trusted channel) or by using sk to encrypt content at RC before sending it indirectly (e.g., via DVD or CD-ROM ) to LC (offline trusted channel). As mentioned in Section 3.3 trusted channel enables access to data only by an authorized compartment (trustworthy configuration). The configuration of a compartment and the underlying TCB are securely measured during the initialization (cf. Section 3.2). Replay attacks on trusted channels can be defeated using one of the freshness solutions described in Section 3.3.
Trusted Storage. SM provides integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and freshness of data as described in Section 3.4. The integrity and confidentiality are achieved by using standard cryptographic mechanisms whereas monotonic hardware counters are used for freshness detection. We have improved common approaches while taking advantage of the strong isolation capability of our architecture that prevents the exposure of cryptographic secrets to unauthorized or malicious processes. Our SM enables compartments to persistently bind their local state to their actual configuration. The verifiable initialization (cf. Section 3.2) verifies whether the TCB components booted are trustworthy, i.e., conform to the underlying security policy.
Given these properties we sketch the analysis of the security objectives. License integrity (O1): Trusted channels ensure that only mutually trusted compartments can modify a license, whereas strong isolation and trusted storage prevent unauthorized alteration of licenses at runtime and while persistently stored. License enforcement (O2): License and content are sent only to a local compartment whose configuration matches that of DC. Further, the isolation property prevents any other malicious code from accessing the content or modifying the license. Freshness (O3): The freshness extension (cf. Section 3.3) and SM ensure that any data loaded is the last one stored. Availability (O4): Trusted storage ensures the availability of licenses unless the license terms and conditions are violated. Privacy (O5): The properties of our architecture such as isolation and binding and the fact that security policy defined by the platform owner restricts the I/O behavior of every application imply that even if third party applications, like DC, can locally enforce their own security policy, they cannot bypass the defined overall security policy. In particular, the information revealed to third parties (content providers) is restricted following the least privilege policy, e.g., only the configuration of the TCB and DC essential for transferring licenses are revealed.
However, if it is required not to reveal the TCB configuration a possible extension to our architecture would be to add property-based attestation service [36] to TM and CM to hide both the (binary) configuration of the TCB and DC.
Summary
In this paper, we introduced the design, the realization and implementation of an open security architecture that is capable to enforce stateful licences on open platforms. Particularly, it allows the transfer of stateful licences, while preventing replay attacks. Further, the security architecture provides security properties such as strong isolation that are used to enforce the user's policy, e.g., protecting against spyware. We have shown how to implement this security architecture by means of virtualization technology, an (open source) security kernel, trusted computing functionality, and a legacy operating system (currently Linux).
The building blocks needed for stateful licenses can also enable offline superdistribution [4] . For example, in our motivating scenario, Timo could generate a new license for Anna's device. The DRM controller will record this fact in its stateful license until Timo pays for the new copy. Allowing copies to be made while still retaining the ability for proper metering and reporting of new copies will enable rapid legal spread of popular content. We plan to describe this extension more fully in a forthcoming paper.
Finally, copyright itself is a strongly debated topic. In course of time, the world may develop alternative business models that do not require protection of copyright in its current form. However, the type of platform security described is also useful in many other applications like copy-protected ticketing, and electronic money. In fact, the same techniques that are used to protect the interests of a third party from a malicious device owner can also help protect the device owner from a thief who stole the device.
A Approaches to Realize Freshness Detection Using TPM Functionality
-DI-Register: TPMs version 1.1b provide a Data Integrity Register (DIR) that can persistently store a 160 bit value [23, 25] . Unfortunately, access to this register is only authorized by the TPM-Owner secret implying that the TPM-Owner can always perform replay attacks. The only solution would be to distribute platforms with an activated TPM and an owner authorization secret that is unknown to the user. This solution does not conform to the TCG specification that requires to ship TCG-enabled platform without any owner secret already set (cf. [50] , page 139). -SRK Recreation: An alternative way to prevent replay attacks based on TPMs version 1.1b would be to create a new Storage Root Key (SRK) before the system is shut down. Recreation of the SRK would prevent that previously created TPM encryption keys can be used any more. Unfortunately, a SRK can only be renewed by the TakeOwnership function which itself requires a previously OwnerClear that itself disables the TPM. Therefore, an online-recreation of the SRK seems to be impossible. -NV-RAM: TPMs version 1.2 provide a limited amount of non-volatile (NV-) RAM to which access is restricted to authorized entities. So-called NV-Attributes define which entities are authorized to write to and/or read from the NV-RAM. Thus, data integrity can be preserved by storing a hash value of the data into the NV-RAM and ensuring that only the Storage Manager can access the authorization secret. -Secure Counter: A TPM version 1.2 supports at least four monotonic counters. Based on this functionality, the freshness of data can be detected by securely concatenating it with the actual counter value.
